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DO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS FACILITATE POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM; CAN THEY?
Nicole Mansker∗ & Neal Devins**
Four months ago, Iowa voters tossed out three justices who backed samesex marriage. Academic and media commentary of the elections largely
focused on the related questions of whether judicial elections fundamentally
threaten judicial independence and whether constitutional change can be
pursued through something less draconian than the ouster of judges. The
possibility that judicial elections should be embraced as a vehicle to facilitate
constitutional dialogues between voters, elected officials, and judges got no
meaningful play in discussions of the Iowa elections. Likewise, there was next
to no discussion of whether judicial elections facilitate “popular
constitutionalism”—by making fundamental constitutional questions more
tangible, more immediate.1
The Iowa elections certainly call attention to the need to think about the
mechanisms by which voters can constructively engage in popular
constitutionalism. Likewise, the advent of the Tea Party (which regularly
invoked the Federal Constitution in its call to rein in governmental power)
highlights the potential power of social movements in shaping constitutional
discourse and, in so doing, highlights the need to—as Larry Kramer put it—
consider “what kind of institutions we can construct to make popular
constitutionalism work.”2 For this and many other reasons, David Pozen’s
“Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism”3 is timely and important.
Recognizing that a major problem impeding the implementation of popular
constitutionalism is the lack of an institutional structure that can foster popular
∗
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1. Popular constitutionalism is the idea that society must move away from the juricentric
constitutional culture and allow for the people themselves to assert their authority over the
identification and enforcement of constitutional norms.
Correspondingly, popular
constitutionalism rejects judicial supremacy as breeding citizen passivity, elite rule, constitutional
alienation, and judicial overreaching. For an introduction to popular constitutionalism, see
generally Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review (2004).
2. Larry Kramer, Response, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1173, 1182 (2006).
3. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L. Rev.
2047 (2010).
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constitutionalism in a coherent and beneficial way, Pozen posits that popular
constitutionalism has a strong ally in the institution of state judicial elections.
In so doing, Pozen seeks a paradigm shift in popular constitutionalism—
recognizing that popular constitutionalism cannot be moored to nationwide
conversations about the Federal Constitution but, instead, must take into
account the profound role that state courts and state constitutions play in
shaping our national constitutional discourse. Equally significant, Pozen
recognizes that popular constitutionalist discourse must shift focus away from
the theoretical question of whether popular constitutionalism is legitimate to
the methodological question of institutional design.
Calling judicial elections a “systematic and pervasive mechanism for
popular constitutionalism,” Pozen argues that state judicial elections are a
“focal point with which to stimulate and structure constitutional deliberation.”4
His article conceives of judicial elections as vehicles for popular
constitutionalism. The basis for this thought experiment is understandable—
elections create a dialogue between the people and the courts, make courts and
the work of the courts more salient and comprehensible, facilitate discourse,
and provide judges with a means to determine the popular will. Moreover,
state courts play a major role in interpreting and enforcing the Federal
Constitution, and, perhaps more importantly, state courts are often at the
cutting edge of recognizing rights that will eventually spill over into the
national constitutional discourse. Finally, state judges interested in retaining
their seats will take popular opinion into account when deciding cases, and if
they do not, elections will force out judges insensitive to the people—
presumably to be replaced by judges whose views will be shaped by popular
constitutional discourse.
In a recent article, published as part of a University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law symposium on the judiciary and the popular
will, we discussed just that: the role of public opinion in state supreme court
decisionmaking.5 Though constitutional scholars have discussed for years
whether public opinion has any influence on the United States Supreme Court,
few scholars have focused their attention on state supreme courts. Like Pozen,
we sought to move the discussion of the influence of popular opinion on
judicial decisionmaking to the state level. We note that the gap in the literature
with respect to state courts is particularly unfortunate given the role state
supreme courts play in our constitutional system.6 Looking to the unique
features of state supreme courts, we posit that state supreme court
responsiveness to the will of the people is linked to the direct democracy
features of the state, including most importantly the selection and retention
methods of state supreme court justices. Our research is thus a useful starting
point in which to consider the workability of state judicial elections as vehicles
4. Id. at 2050.
5. Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 455 (2010).
6. See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account, 62 Stan.
L. Rev. 1629, 1630–39 (2010) (“Over the past thirty years, state courts have eclipsed the U.S.
Supreme Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values, both in their home states and
throughout the nation.”).
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of popular constitutionalism. We identify different limits than those articulated
by Pozen for using judicial elections in this regard.
First, a bit about our research.7 Our research indicates that most state
supreme court justices have the incentive and capacity to take into account
potential voter backlash. This is a result of the unique features of state courts
that make them more democratically accountable than their federal
counterparts. Simply put, state judicial systems are subject to far more checks
than the federal judiciary. With the exception of but a few states, state
supreme court justices do not serve life terms, the level of docket control that a
state supreme court possesses varies widely from virtually total control to no
control, and eleven states, either by constitution or statute, authorize or require
the state supreme court to give advisory opinions. Initiatives and referendums
are in wide use in many states, and eighteen states allow citizens to use the
initiative process to amend the state constitution. The constitutions themselves
are a point of distinction. The amendability of some state constitutions makes
them more like super statutes than like solemn documents of irreducible rights,
whereas other state constitutions are of comparable difficulty to amend as the
Federal Constitution. Of course, the most significant distinction between state
and federal courts is judicial elections. Thirty-nine states subject their state
supreme court justices to some form of elections, either retention, partisan or
nonpartisan.
After reviewing the distinctly democratic features of state supreme courts,
we turned to existing empirical evidence to determine if there was a connection
between state supreme court decisionmaking and public opinion. In states with
contested elections, state justices, like other politicians, “have a tendency to
vote in accordance with perceived constituency preferences on visible issues,
simply because the failure to do so is politically dangerous.”8 Crime and death
penalty issues force justices subject to all election types to consider public
opinion. However, studies find that state supreme court justices are influenced
by their retention constituencies, especially when an election is near.9
Based on the existing research, we set out to expand the discussion of the
influence of public opinion on state supreme courts. We gathered data on a
variety of high salience issues, including abortion, same-sex marriage, school
finance, gun control, and crime to determine if there was a link between public
opinion and state supreme court decisions. For our analysis, we divided states
into four groups: (1) partisan election states, (2) nonpartisan election states,
(3) merit plan states, and (4) gubernatorial or legislative appointment states.
We found that justices facing partisan elections are more likely to consider
public opinion in their decisionmaking. Regardless of retention election
method, state supreme court justices generally align with public opinion on
7. In addition to the research in our recent article published in the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, the following discussion is also drawn from Devins,
supra note 6.
8. Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the
American States, 29 Am. Pol. Q. 485, 489–90 (1995).
9. Devins & Mansker, supra note 5, at 482. Appointed judges responded more often to the
will of the legislature and governor than to the will of the people, and judges in their last term
before retirement responded less to any sort of political will. Id.
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high salience issues. However, the retention election method is relevant to the
frequency with which state supreme courts decide cases contrary to the popular
will. Courts in partisan and nonpartisan election states appear less inclined to
hear high salience issues to begin with and less inclined to rule against public
opinion when retained through partisan or nonpartisan elections. At the same
time, we recognized that there are few issues of such high salience such that
the public will be cognizant of the decisions of state supreme court justices.
With respect to the low salience issues, the courts have incentive to turn to
business interests and campaign donors, especially given the infusion of money
into judicial campaigns in recent years. Empirical evidence and anecdotal
evidence indicate that justices are sensitive to the business interests that fund
their campaigns (in partisan and nonpartisan election states). Indeed, judges
themselves recognize that money can influence a judge’s decisions both
consciously and unconsciously.10
In the end, our analysis indicates that state supreme courts are influenced
by public opinion, at least with respect to high salience issues, and especially if
the court is subject to partisan or nonpartisan elections. This is not necessarily
the equivalent, however, of positing that judicial elections can facilitate
popular constitutionalism.
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM? WELL, WHAT ABOUT THOSE
CONSTITUTIONS?
In considering popular constitutionalism, it is important to first look to the
constitution itself. State constitutions are much more malleable than the
Federal Constitution.11 The states have adopted in total more than 147
different constitutions. Thirty states have had three or more constitutions in
their histories, and Louisiana has had eleven constitutions. State constitutions
are regularly amended (Alabama over 800 times), and the procedures for
amending are often far more lax than the procedures for amending the Federal
Constitution. Furthermore, in eighteen states, citizens can play a direct role in
shaping the constitution through the initiative process. The result has been, in
some states, constitutions that are more like super statutes that elevate what
most would consider to be ordinary law to the status of constitutional law; state
constitutions look like super legislation, “not sacred texts.”12 As Pozen
himself points out, “[s]tate constitutions never attained any mythical status.”13
The amendability of state constitutions is important to a discussion of
popular constitutionalism and state judicial elections. First, it suggests that—
irrespective of judicial elections—citizens are already directly involved in
shaping constitutional culture through constitutional amendment initiatives and
state legislatures are or can be involved in changing the constitutional text to
reflect voter preferences. Second, the amendabilty of state constitutions calls
10. Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices in Support of Petitioners at
5, Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).
11. See Devins, supra note 6, at 1639–44 (examining state constitutions).
12. Lawrence Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, 496 Annals Am.
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 33, 35 (1988).
13. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2088.
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into question the idea that state constitutions are a separate, higher, more
fundamental law than is ordinary law. Correspondingly, provisions in several
state constitutions suggest that these constitutions are anything but
fundamental law. Examples abound, including an article of the Arkansas
constitution devoted to railroads, canals, and turnpikes; a provision of the New
York constitution specifying the width of ski trails in the Adirondak Park; and
a provision of the Texas constitution governing the use of unmanned teller
machines at banks.
In certain respects, popular constitutionalism at the state level becomes
just a call for citizen lawmaking, a more democratic society, rather than a call
for citizens to actively engage in the creation and enforcement of the type of
constitutional norms that animate popular constitutionalism theory. Perhaps
more fundamentally, citizens (or their representatives) are well positioned to
nullify state judicial decisionmaking.14 Any interpretation disliked by the
people can be remedied through amendments either directly in states with
constitutional initiatives or indirectly through the people’s representatives.
None of this is to say that state constitutions cannot operate as fundamental
law—It is often the case that they do, and it is often the case that state court
interpretations of state constitutions transform the national constitutional
landscape. As noted earlier, state courts sometimes play a critical leadership
role in shaping our most fundamental constitutional values. With that said, the
different natures of state and federal constitutions must be acknowledged in
any state-focused theory of popular constitutionalism.
II. STATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
In thirty-nine states, state supreme court justices are subject to some form
of election.15 Before the mid-1980s, there was little reason to think that state
judicial elections held much promise for popular constitutionalism. At that
time, elections were seen as “low key affairs[,] [c]onducted with civility and
dignity, which were as exciting as a game of checkers . . . [p]layed by mail.”16
Over the past twenty-five years (and especially in the past several years), “[t]he
confluence of broadened freedom for [judicial candidates] to speak out on
issues, the increasing importance of state judicial politics, and the infusion of
money into judicial campaigns have produced what may be described as the
‘Perfect Storm’ of judicial elections.”17
Today, as David Pozen explained in a 2008 Columbia Law Review
article,18 state supreme court elections often look similar to the typical partisan
election in the legislative and executive branches. Money is playing an ever

14. Pozen recognizes this; among other things, his article calls attention to various
mechanisms by which voters and lawmakers can amend state constitutions—including direct
democracy responses to unpopular court rulings. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2088–93.
15. Devins & Mansker, supra note 5, at 460.
16. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 Duke L. J. 1589, 1602
(2009).
17. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy
Theory and ‘New-Style’ Judicial Campaigns, 102 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 59, 60 (2008).
18. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 265 (2008).
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expanding role in judicial elections—from 2000–2009 more than two and onehalf times the amount of money was raised for state supreme court elections
than from 1990–1999.19 Unsurprisingly, expenditures are almost entirely in
the fourteen states with partisan and nonpartisan elections. The combination of
fewer restraints on judicial candidate speech and the infusion of money into
judicial campaigns has resulted in more competitive and contested elections
with higher loss rates for judges subject to partisan and nonpartisan elections.
As the amount spent on judicial elections has spiked, so has the tenor of
negative advertising in such elections.20 The role of business interests in
shaping judicial elections has also spiked, with probusiness interest groups
now accounting for 44% of fundraising and 90% of special interest television
and advertising.21
This transformation in state judicial elections cuts both ways for popular
constitutionalists. On the one hand, there is reason to think that state supreme
courts have the capacity and incentive to take popular opinion into account—
clearly something that cuts in favor of judicial elections and popular
constitutionalism. On the other hand, the prospect of meaningful popular
constitutionalist discourse is severely limited both by the tendency for voters to
consider only a handful of high salience issues and by the pervasive influence
of business and out-of-state interests. Unlike Pozen (who thinks that concerns
of issue salience and structural issues tied to how judges are elected can be
ameliorated),22 we think that the ability of special interests to capitalize on
voter uninterest in low salience issues severely limits the use of state judicial
elections as a mechanism to facilitate popular constitutionalism.23
A. Judicial Candidate Characteristics and Capacity To Discern Public
Opinion
State supreme court justices are well positioned to discern public opinion
and the likelihood of backlash to their decisions.24 In comparison to their
federal counterparts, particularly Justices on the United States Supreme Court,
state justices are far more versed in state politics and are more connected to
voters, political parties, campaign contributors, and interest groups. State
justices are generally well informed regarding the in-state political climate by
virtue of their membership in the state and their professional and social
interactions. For example, as of 2000, 65.7% of justices were born in the state
19. Devins & Mansker, supra note 5, at 465–67.
20. Devins, supra note 6, at 1662.
21. See James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2006, at 7, 18 (2006),
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/49c18b6cb18960b2f9_z6m62gwji.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
22. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2099 (concluding concerns about efficacy of judicial elections
are not necessarily responsive to use of judicial elections as a means to advance popular
constitutionalism).
23. This is not to say that contested state judicial elections undermine the legitimacy of state
supreme courts. Voters may see elections as legitimating mechanisms—even if they are only
personally interested in a handful of high salience issues. Thanks to Jim Gibson for discussing
with us his ongoing research on the ways in which judicial elections might legitimate state
supreme court decisionmaking.
24. This subsection is drawn from Devins, supra note 6, at 1668–71.
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in which they serve, and 60.5% received law degrees from schools in the state.
Also, 33.1% of justices served as prosecutors at some point in their career, and
15% formerly served as elected officials. Finally, states themselves are much
smaller units in which to discern public opinion and voter backlash risks.
Particularly relevant to whether contested judicial elections can facilitate
popular constitutionalism is that justices facing contested elections are of a
different type or quality than appointed justices and are, thus, more likely to
understand the political ramifications of their decisions.25 Judges subject to
contested elections look and act more like politicians. They attend lowerranked law schools and are more politically connected and overall less well
educated than appointed judges. Social psychology tells us that it is a basic
human desire to be liked; thus, it is no surprise that judicial candidates facing
the electorate have a strong interest in the esteem of the public.26 It seems
clear, then, that state supreme court justices facing contested elections are more
attuned to the popular will—a plus factor for the popular constitutionalist—but
at the same time, it must be recognized that there are few issues that will
trigger the public’s attention.
B. Issue Saliency
High salience issues such as abortion, the death penalty, and crime are
often the subjects of judicial campaigns. Indeed, past judicial elections have
taught that justices can be ousted due to their vote in a single case on one of
these topics, often a vote portrayed incorrectly or deceptively by the opposition
campaign or interest group. State supreme court justices clearly recognize
these high salience, high stakes issues. Former California Supreme Court
Justice Otto Kaus has remarked that “[t]here’s no way a judge is going to be
able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he
or she has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring a
crocodile in your bathtub.”27 There are also reports of Georgia and Louisiana
justices changing their votes in response to perceived voter sanctions.28 At
first blush, this type of judicial response may seem promising for the prospects
of judicial elections as tools for popular constitutionalism. Justices are taking
into account public opinion and the consequences of ignoring it with respect to
these high salience issues.
However, the story is a bit more complicated. Not only did those Georgia
and Louisiana justices change their votes, they also admitted to overlooking

25. Pozen recognizes this when he notes that one of the challenges to judicial elections as
vehicles of popular constitutionalism is that elections breed lower quality candidates or moneyfocused candidates who play favorites with donors, interest groups, political parties, and popular
litigants. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2099.
26. See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior
62 (2006) (“[T]he public vote still exists as a well-publicized evaluation, and it can be important
to judges’ self-esteem that they secure as positive an evaluation as possible even if they do not
fear defeat.”).
27. Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1987). It is interesting to
note that California Supreme Court justices are subject to retention elections, not contested
partisan or nonpartisan elections. The pressure of elections, to some degree it seems, is universal.
28. Devins, supra note 6, at 1664.
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errors in criminal cases, instead passing them on to the federal courts, secured
with their lifetime appointments, to make the difficult decisions.29 Instead of
correcting legal errors (often unrelated to constitutional questions), the justices
passed on the issues to avoid voter sanction. This indicates that on high
salience issues, justices avoid controversy in the name of judicial preservation
and, in so doing, simply maintain the status quo. Indeed, our research supports
this conclusion. We found state supreme court justices subject to contested
elections decided fewer high salience issues than those justices subject to
retention elections or appointment schemes. Pozen notes the problem himself,
recognizing that backlash to judicial decisions can facilitate popular
constitutionalism; it can “sharpen constitutional questions, catalyze political
engagement, and ultimately invigorate the popular responsiveness of
constitutional law.”30 If judges are simply avoiding the high salience issues, as
research indicates, in order to avoid electoral defeat, instead of facilitating
popular constitutionalism, judicial elections may neuter the courts as
arbitrators and reduce judicial creativity and courage.
Another concern for popular constitutionalism tied to issue saliency is the
nature of the issues that are salient. For the most part, contested judicial
elections do not turn on constitutional questions. Questions of judicial
character, tort law, and criminal law typically play larger roles in judicial
elections than do questions of constitutional law. Moreover, even when
constitutional issues are at the forefront of a judicial race (Iowa, for example),
voters typically focus their energies on a single issue—rather than participate
in a broader conversation about the meaning of far-ranging constitutional
values.
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that politically insulated state
supreme courts play a path-breaking role, forging new constitutional
understandings.31 On same-sex marriage, no state with partisan or nonpartisan
elections has expanded the rights of same-sex couples. Of the seven states that
constitutionalized same-sex marriage or civil union, five were from the eleven
states that do not make use of judicial elections. Courts subject to elections are
seriously hampered in their ability to lead the way in forward thinking and
move the direction of future public opinion. Elected judges are thus unlikely
to attempt to forge new constitutional understanding, thereby “contribut[ing]
nothing distinctive to the ‘discursive formation of popular will upon which
democracy is based.’”32
C. Information and the Public’s Capacity To Engage in Popular
Constitutionalism Through Judicial Elections
The question of voter capacity to constructively engage in popular

29. Id. at 1664.
30. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2128–29.
31. For a discussion of the characteristics of path-breaking states, see Devins, supra note 6,
at 1675–85.
32. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2131 (quoting Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1027, 1036
(2004)).
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constitutional discourse through judicial elections is, of course, central to
Pozen’s project and our critique of it. In our view, there are significant
concerns about popular election of judges, prime among them being whether
citizens can select judges and interpret and enforce the constitution in a
reasoned and responsible way. Do people have the capacity to achieve the
goals of popular constitutionalism given a society apathetic and ignorant in the
voting booth? Research shows that the majority of Americans lack basic
political comprehension and nearly one third are “political ‘know nothings’
who possess little or no useful knowledge of politics.”33 Pozen finds such
criticisms “inconclusive,” reporting that research shows that judicial elections
can meet minimal criteria of efficacy (despite the fact that judicial elections
lack public dialogue on constitutional interpretation or judicial duty). Pozen
insists that “elections generate more regular and robust information about the
content of public opinion.”34 Thus, they act as signaling functions as to
popular opinion.
Although it is true that competitive elections promote greater public
involvement and provide information about public opinion to judicial
candidates, the information that judicial elections create (both about judicial
candidates for the public and about public opinion for judicial candidates) is
often of limited use to advancing popular constitutionalism. Advertising in
judicial elections has become more negative, and interest groups are funding
advertising focusing only on hot-button issues such as crime and the death
penalty, or the personal characteristics of the candidates.35 Those hot-button
issues are likely to rile the public. But the public is rarely signaling anything
to the court that the court does not already know with respect to those topics.
People generally think criminals should face long sentences, and often the
state’s public opinion on the death penalty is well known. Yet the portrayal of
decisions of justices is often misleading, focusing on one case and distorting
facts of that one case.
At the same time, as our research shows, judges in contested elections
typically rule in ways that match public opinion—suggesting that judicial
elections do hold promise to check state justices on hot-button constitutional
questions. The problem, however, is that there are very few constitutionally
salient issues and judicial elections rarely invoke any discussion of the
constitution. More than that, business interests will often run negative ads
concerning crime and judicial character—in an effort to manipulate public
opinion and secure the election of probusiness justices. Correspondingly, on
constitutionally salient issues like same-sex marriage, out-of-state interest
groups often play a defining role in financing negative advertising and

33. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1287, 1304–05
(2004); see also Pozen, supra note 3, at 2093.
34. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2120.
35. Probusiness interests fund much of judicial campaigns and especially advertising, yet
the focus of the advertising they pay for has nothing to do with business interests. Advertising
focuses almost entirely on irrelevant or distorted personal characteristics and high salience issues
such as crime.
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otherwise seek to shape judicial elections.36
In highlighting the role of business interests and out-of-state interest
groups, we are not claiming that in-state voters never engage in some type of
constitutional dialogue with state justices through judicial elections. They do.
The question is at what price and whether, ultimately, the benefits of judicial
elections outweigh their costs. In our view, judicial elections as they exist
today do not appear to be great tools for the advancement of popular
constitutionalism. Judges take into account public opinion in decisionmaking,
but the advancement of constitutional dialogue is not part of that intercourse.
Instead, judges subject to election avoid controversial decisions and seek to
maintain the status quo. Judicial elections are increasingly politicized, costly,
and competitive. Furthermore, the issues which trigger any public opinion at
all are rarely of a constitutional nature. It seems clear that what competitive
judicial elections do is politicize the court and focus on single issues and
irrelevant personal characteristics that a popular constitutionalist would not
find valuable.
Some of the shortcomings in the ability of judicial elections to serve as a
mechanism to facilitate popular constitutionalism can be dealt with through
reforms to existing state systems. To his great credit, Pozen both (1)
acknowledges the problems associated with judicial elections and how they
might impact the advancement of popular constitutionalism, and (2) suggests
that judicial elections can be reformed to mitigate only some of these problems
and, as such, are “defective vehicles” to facilitate popular constitutionalism.
At the same time (and also to his credit), Pozen advances a series of reforms
intended to improve judicial elections in ways that advance the goals of
popular constitutionalism. Concerns about voter competence and participation
in judicial elections are really issues of institutional design, Pozen argues. He
states that “[i]t is at least conceivable that an elective system could be
engineered to provide sufficiently robust competition, accountability, and
debate to excite popular constitutionalists, while also providing sufficiently
robust protections for judicial independence and public confidence.”37 To
arouse voter interest in judicial elections, states might try reforms such as
permitting political party affiliation by judicial candidates, liberalizing codes
of conduct to allow judicial candidates to make pledges on how they will
approach certain kinds of cases, disseminating voter information guides on
judicial candidates, and holding public events, assemblies, or debates. Pozen
argues that, “[i]f campaigns for the bench could be engineered to generate
robust information about the candidates and their views, it would become
increasingly untenable to insist that voters nonetheless lack the ability to make
rational decisions.”38 States can also enhance recusal rules or apply stricter
contribution limits, or increase term lengths to address problems with the
36. In Iowa, for example, out-of-state interest groups contributed more than in-state groups
in seeking to oust justices who ruled in favor of same-sex marriage. Press Release, Brennan Ctr.
for Justice, 2010 Judicial Elections Increase Pressure on Courts, Reform Groups Say (Nov. 3,
2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/release-november%202010110310-final.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
37. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2103.
38. Id. at 2098.
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influence of donors and interest groups. Nonetheless, recognizing numerous
limits in the ability of judicial elections to facilitate popular constitutionalism,
Pozen concludes that the ability of reforms to create robust elective systems
that facilitate popular constitutionalism is “exceedingly unlikely.”39
Pozen deserves a lot of credit for thinking about mechanisms that will
facilitate popular constitutionalism through judicial elections. With that said,
like Pozen, we are skeptical that such proposals, in fact, will work. Elected
judiciaries already take into account the will of the people, but not in a manner
conducive to popular constitutionalism. The root problem, we think, is voter
interest in either the state or federal constitutions. For reform proposals to
work, they must address the lack of constitutional dialogue in judicial
elections. In reality, high salience issues, rarely of constitutional tenor, are the
subjects of judicial elections. Elections themselves work to politicize the
courts. Recusal rules and stricter contribution limits will not stem that tide;
they will not change the single issue or irrelevant personal characteristic focus
of advertising.
That said, perhaps other state features outside of judicial elections are
better suited to advance the popular constitutionalists goals, such as
constitutional initiatives and referenda and easy to amend constitutions.
Constitutional amendment is the principal mechanism by which states now
update their constitutions. With constitutional initiatives voters write and
approve the contents of their constitutions and are directly involved in forming
and shaping their state’s constitutional culture. These features do not politicize
the courts. They do not subject all judicial decisions to voter approval. At the
same time, they act as checks on court interpretations of the constitution, and
they signal directly to the justices the popular will. Finally, they provide not
only a tool for the public to express displeasure with court constitutional
decisions, but also a means to overrule such decisions. Given our research on
the role of public opinion in state supreme court decisionmaking, we find that,
although state supreme courts take into account popular opinion on certain
issues, the realities of competitive judicial elections make them unsatisfactory
tools to truly facilitate popular constitutionalism’s goals.
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